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A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. viii Preface for more than a century. 1 Not even the members of the current US Supreme Court agree with one another regarding which provision in the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the state police from knocking down your door when you speak against your governor, seek solace from your God, or take refuge in your home. Initially, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Bill of Rights against the states.
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3 In the early twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court reversed course and began to "incorporate" certain federal rights against the states into the Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's declaration that "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
4 One by one, Preface ix provisions like the Takings Clause, 5 the Freedom of Speech Clause, 6 and the Free Exercise Clause 7 were announced by the Court to be "fundamental liberties" protected against state action under the doctrine of "substantive" due process.
This reading of the Due Process Clause is in serious tension with the text. Rather than guaranteeing certain substantive rights, the text suggests that life, liberty, and property may be deprived so long as a state provides "due process."
8 Worse, this reading seems clearly contradicted by the Bill of Rights itself, which includes a Due Process Clause (in the Fifth Amendment) separate from the other rights listed in the first eight amendments, 9 indicating that the protections of the Due Process Clause do not include these other substantive rights. There is no evidence whatsoever that any framer of the Fourteenth Amendment believed the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause applied the Bill of Rights against the states, and the vast majority of Fourteenth Amendment scholars believe that the Court has chosen the wrong Clause (and the wrong doctrine) for incorporating the Bill of Rights.
10 When recently offered the opportunity to abandon the doctrine, the Court stood by substantive due process, not as a matter of a persuasive reading of the text, but simply due to the force of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.
11 In other words, the Court's current practice of enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states is due more to the inertia of past precedent than a result of a persuasive reading of the Constitution. 
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One suspects the reason the Supreme Court has avoided the Privileges or Immunities Clause is due to the failure of lawyers and legal scholars to articulate a historically plausible and judicially manageable interpretation of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." For example, in the 2010 case McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court was presented with the rare opportunity to shift its Fourteenth Amendment individual rights jurisprudence from the embarrassment of "substantive due process" to the far more textually plausible Privileges or Immunities Clause. While making his argument before the Supreme Court, plaintiff's counsel was asked to define the limits of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Although his client sought nothing more than incorporation of the Second Amendment, counsel nevertheless responded that "it's impossible to give a full list of unenumerated rights that might be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause."
12 The reply almost guaranteed that the Court's decision would not invoke Privileges or Immunities Clause, if only to avoid opening a Pandora's box of "impossible to fully list" unenumerated rights.
13
But legal scholars have done no better in defining the scope of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Despite widely divergent interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, almost all current Fourteenth Amendment scholars believe that the Clause was modeled on Article IV, Section 2 of the federal Constitution, which declares "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
14 The most famous antebellum decision involving the so-called Comity Clause was a circuit court opinion written by George Washington's nephew, Bushrod Washington, in Corfield v. Coryell. 15 In Corfield, Judge Washington wrote that the provision protected "those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments."
16 Because the same members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who framed and adopted the Privileges or Immunities 17 These scholars disagree about the particular manner in which Corfieldian "fundamental rights" bind the states, but all agree that the Comity Clause of Article IV and cases like Corfield are the lens through which we (and courts) should view the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This book explains why this is wrong, both as a matter of text and as a matter of history. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not based on the language of Article IV; it is based on the language of antebellum national treaties like the Louisiana Cession Act of 1803 and the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and echoed in the Alaskan Cession Act of 1867. These acts declared the rights, privileges, and immunities "of citizens of the United States," a category of "privileges or immunities" altogether different from the rights of state citizenship protected under Section 2 of Article IV. As the framer of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, explained, Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
18
These personal rights are "chiefly defined" in the Bill of Rights, but they include all constitutionally enumerated personal rights. More controversially, perhaps, the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause included only those rights enumerated in the Constitution. Neither Congress nor the country in 1866 wished to erase constitutionally established limits on federal power, including the limited powers of the federal courts. What was lacking was a constitutional provision expressly requiring the states to respect those rights placed in the Constitution by the people themselves and which had come to be viewed as representing the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
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METHODOLOGY
This book presents the history of a legal concept: the constitutional privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Although it includes analysis of key historical figures and events, the focus throughout is on the evolution of an idea and its entrenchment as fundamental law. This is, in other words, a book of legal history. The analysis in the chapters that follow presumes that law, as such, reflects particular social movements of the time but also plays a role in affecting and shaping those movements.
19 Law is itself a player in the drama of American history; it transcends the moment of its enactment and sets into motion future consequences that may or may not have been anticipated or intended by those who brought the law into being. This is true of all law, and it is particularly true of constitutional law.
To constitutionalize a subject or right means to place the matter beyond the reach of ordinary political decision making. The goal of one who frames and adopts a constitutional text is to constrain the options of future political actors and protect the future people from the self-interested or short-sighted decisions of future politicians. Put another way, a constitution is meant to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." 20 But those who frame constitutional text control neither its interpretation nor its actual operation. Political partisans inevitably seek to bend a legal text to their will, regardless of original or even current consensus understanding of the text. Times change and post-adoption events may illuminate issues and concerns unknown or underappreciated at the time of enactment, developments that affect how people read and understand constitutional text. At the very least, one may expect that politicians have an incentive to claim that the pressures of the moment illuminate needs unconsidered by the people of the past. There is no guarantee, in other words, that one's posterity will actually enjoy the blessings of liberty one seeks to secure by way of constitutional entrenchment.
Those who shaped the fundamental legal texts of American law understood the realities of time, passion, and politics. But they also shared an almost religious faith in the possibility of text-based constraints on the powers and actions of government officials. The American Constitution, a written and Preface xiii judicially enforceable charter of government power, is itself an expression of the newly formed faith of American revolutionaries in popular sovereignty.
21
Unlike their contemporaries in England, who had cast off the prerogative of Kings in favor of the sovereignty of the English Parliament, legal and political theorists in the Atlantic colonies embraced the idea that the people stand over and apart from their institutions of government.
22 Governments and political representatives are not the people themselves. They are no more than the people's agents, whose powers go no further than that authorized by the people in a written and enforceable constitution. A written constitution serves as a lasting expression of the people's will and declares the degree to which the people consent to the exercise of government power. The document both defines and limits the legitimate powers of the people's agents and continues to act as a constraint until such time as the people themselves alter or abolish their fundamental law through constitutional amendment or political revolution.
It is this lasting effect of entrenched principles of law, law immunized from the choices of transient political majorities, that makes constitutional law an especially appropriate choice for independent historical investigation. "Constitution" law not only plays the same partially autonomous role of all law, it is peculiarly designed to play such a role. Rather than merely mirroring the political choices of an age, it sets the terms for and, to a certain degree, the boundaries of future political choices. The same is true of all statutes and foundational documents which, even if not legally entrenched, nevertheless serve as constitutive elements of majoritarian political culture. Examples would include the Declaration of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, 23 and, perhaps, major judicial opinions such as Marbury v. Madison 24 and McCulloch v. Maryland. 25 Political movements that plausibly frame their efforts in conjunction with these culturally embraced legal landmarks increase their odds of public acceptance and success. Likewise, political movements that appear out of step with constitutive laws and documents will pay a political price, and, to that degree, are less likely to succeed. Nor are these cultural legal landmarks limited to celebrated past events. Notorious past events, such as the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 26 may become a framing device for understanding proposed legal reforms. In all cases, the 21 See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1998 Consensus understanding of past law not only affects the likely success of later legal movements, but also shapes the legal rhetoric and the proposed legal language of later successful movements. If one seeks to discover the original public understanding of a legal text in general, and of a constitutional text in particular, one must understand the relationship between the officially adopted text and the historical antecedents that informed the framers' choice of that text and the likely public understanding of that text. For example, seen from afar, the language in the Fourteenth Amendment seems to have nothing to do with the second Bank of the United States, oyster raking in New Jersey, or the purchase of the Louisiana Territory. Zoom into the actual legal debates surrounding the adoption of the Amendment, however, and the reader discovers that the framers of the Amendment self-consciously framed their efforts in accordance with their understanding of the bank case McCulloch v. Maryland, the oyster case Corfield v. Coryell, and the rights conferred by the Louisiana Cession Act.
The goal of this book is to illuminate the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I define "original meaning" as the likely original understanding of the text at the time of its adoption by competent speakers of the English language who were aware of the context in which the text was communicated for ratification.
27 Determining original meaning requires investigating historical events and texts antecedent to the proposed amendment in order to understand the full historical context in which a proposed text is debated and ratified. This is not an effort to recover the "true" or even "best" meaning of antecedent events and texts. Instead, the goal is to recover how these legal antecedents were broadly understood, correctly or not, at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As an investigation of the original public meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, this book differs from earlier works on the historical Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning with the Fairman-Crossky debates 27 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, Fordham L. Rev. (2013) (manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2307178 ("'Public Meaning Originalism' names the version of originalist theory holding that the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time of origin by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in the context that was shared by the drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.").
www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02326-0 -The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship Kurt T. Lash Frontmatter More information Preface xv of the mid-twentieth century until very recently, 28 most work on the Fourteenth Amendment has sought to uncover the original intentions of the men who framed the text. This "framers' intent" scholarship fell into two broad categories: those who found meaning in the views of particular men like Thaddeus Stevens and John Bingham, and those who rejected even the possibility of finding meaning due to the multiplicity of views espoused by different framers.
29
In recent decades, however, originalist scholarship has generally abandoned the search for framers' intent and instead seeks to uncover evidence of the original meaning of a text.
30 This is an empirical inquiry that looks for common patterns of linguistic usage among competent speakers of the English language. Original meaning investigations have no guaranteed success: It may be possible to find evidence of historical consensus and original understanding in regard to some legal texts, less possible in regard to others, and perhaps not possible at all in regard to a few. And, in all cases, our understanding will be at best only partial. But the reality of incomplete knowledge does not prevent the legal historian from determining whether some meanings are more or less likely than others to have been the original meaning. Just as importantly, sometimes it will be possible to determine that certain textual understandings, even if theoretically possible, are not at all likely.
